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Strategic judgment prooﬁng
Yeon-Koo Che∗
and
Kathryn E. Spier∗∗
A liquidity-constrained entrepreneur raises capital to ﬁnance a business activity that may harm
bystanders. The entrepreneur raises senior (secured) debt to shield assets from the tort victims
in bankruptcy. For a ﬁxed level of borrowing, senior debt creates better incentives for precaution
takingthaneitherjuniordebtoroutsideequity.Theentrepreneur’s levelofborrowingis,however,
socially excessive. Giving tort victims priority over senior debtholders in bankruptcy prevents
overleveraging but leads to suboptimal incentives. Lender liability exacerbates the incentive
problem even further. A limited seniority rule dominates these alternatives. Shareholder liability,
mandatory liability insurance, and punitive damages are also discussed.
1. Introduction
 There was a striking 41% rise in the number of taxi and livery accidents in New York City
in the 1990s. As described in the New York Times, many of the victims—often bystanders on the
sidewalk—found themselves unable to collect their awards after receiving favorable judgments
at trial. There were several reasons for this. First, most of New York City’s 12,000 taxi cabs
were minimally insured. Second, the taxi industry is organized in such a way as to make
taxi medallions—worth about $275,000 each—unreachable by the victims. The owners of the
medallions often use them as collateral for loans, so that “even when the rare victim tries to seize
a medallion in court, it is common to ﬁnd that the owner has attached so much debt to it that
there is little money left to recover.”
1 Furthermore, owners of large ﬂeets often organize their
operations into collections of much smaller taxi companies owning just two or three medallions,
thereby protecting their assets from liability. In the words of Pam Liapakis, former president of
the New York State Trial Lawyers Association, “When one owner can own 100 cars in different
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1Drew and Newman (1998). Much of this debt existed before the accidents took place. On some occasions,
however, taxi owners engaged in additional borrowing following the court’s ﬁndings of liability. This practice, illegal,
further frustrates the victim’s attempts to collect.
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corporations, and then mortgage them toprotect his assetsfromaccident victims,that’swrong....
The purpose of the corporate law is being subverted."
These concerns are hardly unique to the taxi industry. In light of increasing malpractice
premiums, many physicians are protecting their assets with limited liability partnerships,
irrevocable trusts, and offshore trusts, sometimes forgoing malpractice insurance altogether.
Similar strategies are used by accountants, corporate board members, and even lawyers. In a
2003 survey of individuals with personal assets exceeding $1 million, 35% had adopted an asset
protection plan, up from 17% in 2000.
2 Asset protection strategies are not restricted to small
businesses.
3 Following an oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, French oil company Elf Aquitaine
decided to relinquish ownership of its oil prior to shipping it to reﬁneries in the United States
(Sullivan, 1990). More generally, large corporations have an incentive to spin off their most
hazardousactivitiesintoseparateunitswithlimitedﬁnancialassets.
4 Indeed,RinglebandWiggins
(1990) attributed a 20% increase in the number of small corporations between 1967 and 1980
to the outsourcing of risky activities by large corporations to small ﬁrms.
5 Large companies can
also issue secured debt based on their physical assets, and then use the cash received to buy back
equity or pay dividends to existing shareholders (LoPucki, 1996).
6 Furthermore, companies can
issue so-called Bowie bonds to securitize future cash ﬂows, thus making them unavailable to tort
victims.
7
Thisarticleisconcernedwith“strategicjudgmentprooﬁng,”thedeliberatestrategiesusedby
ﬁrms to shield their assets from future accident victims. Although this issue has been discussed in
the legal literature and to some extent in the empirical economics literature, very little theoretical
work has been done. Speciﬁcally, we consider a liquidity-constrained entrepreneur (the injurer)
whoraisescapitaltoﬁnanceariskyactivitythatmayharmothers.Theentrepreneur canjudgment
proof himself through both the method of ﬁnancing (namely through secured senior debt) and the
levelofﬁnancing.Thesetwotacticspotentiallyimposecostsonthirdparties(thetortvictims)and
affect the entrepreneur’s incentives to improve the safety of his operations. We consider the social
desirability of the entrepreneur’s judgment-prooﬁng strategies and the effectiveness of several
proposed remedies.
Taking the level of borrowing as ﬁxed, we ﬁrst show that the entrepreneur would choose to
ﬁnance the risky activity with secured senior debt. Secured senior debt enjoys the highest priority
in bankruptcy, and can therefore be used to shield assets from tort victims. Interestingly, this form
of strategic judgment prooﬁng enhances social welfare. Taking the level of outside ﬁnancing as
ﬁxed, senior debt creates the best incentives for the entrepreneur to take precautions to reduce
the harm to the victims. The reasoning is as follows. The secured senior debtholders face a lower
risk of nonrepayment than the holders of junior claims and, as a consequence, require a lower
interest rate. This lower interest rate makes bankruptcy less likely, leading the entrepreneur to
better internalize the social harm from the risky activity.
8
2Silverman(2003).ThesurveywasconductedbyPrince&Associates,aConnecticutmarketresearchandconsulting
ﬁrm. See also Mandell (1999).
3See also LoPucki (1996), Gilles (2006), and Hansmann and Kraakman (1991).
4Walkovsky v. Carlton, 276 2d 585 (2d Cir. 1966), is a famous veil-piercing case. A cab company had shielded
themselves from liability by incorporating each cab as its own corporation. The court refused to pierce the veil on account
of undercapitalization alone.
5Other empirical work has revealed mixed results. Notably, Brooks (2002) ﬁnds evidence that the oil industry has,
overall, become more vertically integrated in response to increased liability.
6In Warren and Westbrook’s (2005) sample of business bankruptcies, 8.8% of ﬁrms have outstanding lawsuits
and an additional 7.5% face judgment liens; 61.2% of the debt in their sample is secured. Ulph and Valentini’s (2004)
empirical study ﬁnds that increases in environmental liability lead to higher levels of bank debt.
7Thesebondsarenamedaftertherockmusicianwhoissuedsecuritiesbackedbythefuturerevenuesfrompreviously
released albums (Clark, 1997). Corporations securitize assets as diverse as equipment leases, franchise fees, and cash
ﬂows from oil reserves (Harrell, Rice, and Shearer, 1997). These are separate legal entities.
8This intuition is similar to Pitchford’s (1995) observation that lender liability increases the interest rate and
consequently reduces the borrower’s precautions. This is discussed below in more detail.
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Unfortunately, the level of outside ﬁnancing by entrepreneurs is not ﬁxed. We show that the
entrepreneur will secure an excessive amount of senior debt in order to further dilute the value
of the tort claim. In the extreme, the entrepreneur could essentially reduce his liability to zero by
issuing securities whose face value exceeds the upper bound on the future ﬁrm value. Although
secured senior debt is desirable for ﬁxed levels of outside ﬁnancing, overleveraging leads social
welfare to fall because the ﬁrm takes too little care to avoid accidents.
We then explore how several different public policies affect the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial structure
and the entrepreneur’s incentives for care. First, suppose the victims were given priority over
the secured senior debtholders in bankruptcy. Although the mandatory subordination of the
debtholders discourages overborrowing by the ﬁrm, the entrepreneur still takes too little care to
avoid harm. (Subordinated ﬁnancial claimants would require a higher interest rate to compensate
them for the risk of nonrepayment, and so the entrepreneur’s incentives to take precautions are
therefore diluted.) Second, suppose the senior debtholders were held liable for the residual harms
unpaid by the injurer. Lender liability also prevents overborrowing but exacerbates the moral
hazard problem even further. A rule that we call the Limited Seniority Rule dominates these other
policies. Under this rule, the ﬁrm may offer a limited amount of senior debt, after which any
further borrowing is treated as junior to the tort claim. Limited seniority essentially gives the
“best of both worlds.” The junior treatment of the debt beyond the preset limit eliminates the
incentives for overborrowing, whereas the senior status of the debt up to the preset limit implies
that the ﬁrm can borrow at a low interest rate, giving better incentives for precaution taking.
The current article is related to several strands of existing research. First, it is closely related
toliteratureon(exogenous)judgmentproofness.Shavell(1986)wastheﬁrsttorigorouslyanalyze
the judgment-proof problem—that injurers with limited assets will engage in risky activities too
often and will take too little care while doing so.
9 A number of remedies have been explored,
including mandatory liability insurance (Shavell, 1986, 2005), vicarious liability (Dari Mattiacci
and Parisi, 2003), and damage multipliers (Boyd and Ingberman, 1994, 1999).
In the corporate ﬁnance context, Bebchuk and Fried (1996, 1997) have argued that raising
the priority of tort victims in bankruptcy and subordinating debt claims will give the debtholders
a strong incentive to monitor the borrower ex post, improving the ﬁrm’s precautions.
10 Bebchuk
and Fried did not anticipate the negative effect of subordination on incentives identiﬁed here,
however. In work that is the most closely related to ours, Pitchford (1995) considers the impact of
imposingliabilityonlenders.Lenders,anticipatingfutureliability,wouldrequireahigherinterest
rate in compensation. This leaves less remaining wealth for the borrower to lose in the event of an
accident, diluting his incentives for care. He suggested the policy of holding the lender partially
liable as achieving the optimal outcome.
11 A similar prescription is made by Boyer and Laffont
(1997), who observe the agency problem between the lender and the ﬁrm makes it optimal to
hold the lender less than fully liable for the harm. The connection between their remedies and
ours will be discussed in more detail later.
Our article differs from previous research on the judgment-proof problem. We allow the ﬁrm
to endogenously judgment proof itself through a broad class of “standard” ﬁnancial contracts that
encompasses senior debt, junior debt, equity, and convertible debt (in addition to a continuum of
hybrid securities). This plays a central role in our analysis. First, it allows us to explicitly study
the impact of tort liability on the ﬁrm’s method and level of external ﬁnancing. Second, it allows
us to compare and contrast a comprehensive set of public policy remedies. We provide a clear
picture of how various bankruptcy reforms inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s choice of ﬁnancial structure and
9See also Summers (1983). Beard (1990) shows that ﬁrms may take too much care when investments are pecuniary.
Intuitively, expenditures made out of cash reserves are not claimable by tort victims, so tort victims effectively subsidize
the ﬁrm’s pecuniary investments. See also Dari Mattiacci and De Geest (2005).
10See Notes (2003). Similarly, Hansmann and Kraakman (1991) argue in favor of shareholder liability.
11Lewis and Sappington (2001) generalize Pitchford’s binary technology and give the lender more instruments
with which to control the ﬁrm, including nonmonotonic contracts. Some of Pitchford’s main results do not survive this
extension. See also Balkenborg (2001).
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subsequent precaution levels, and the relative advantages of these bankruptcy reforms over lender
liability (either partial or full).
Our article also contributes to the ﬁnance literature on the role of agency costs in the design
of ﬁnancial securities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
12 Innes (1990), assuming a ﬁxed capital
requirement, shows that debts dominate all other standard ﬁnancial contracts in terms of the
incentives they provide to the borrower to maximize the value of the venture.
13 Innes’s model,
like many of the existing models, does not distinguish different types of debt contracts, and thus
does not explain why senior debt would be chosen over junior debt.
14 In our article, the ﬁrm’s
preference for senior debt is driven by the presence of the tort victims.
15
The article is arranged as follows. Section 2 illustrates some of the key contributions of our
article in a simple example. Section 3 lays out the basic assumptions of the model and establishes
a social welfare benchmark. Section 4 characterizes the ﬁnancial decisions and effort choice of
the ﬁrm. Section 5 considers public policy responses, including the elevation of tort victims in
bankruptcy and lender liability. Sections 6 and 7 discuss other remedies of judgment proofness
and discuss several extensions. Section 8 concludes.
2. Example
 Consider an entrepreneur who needs to raise at least $300 to purchase capital—a “taxi
medallion.” The capital market is competitive and the risk-free interest rate is normalized to zero.
The taxi medallion, which does not depreciate in value, will generate an additional cash ﬂow
of $200 under the control of the entrepreneur. Although the cash ﬂow is riskless, the business
activity is risky in the sense that it may cause harm to other people. For the moment, let us
assume that there is an exogenous one-in-ten probability that the activity will cause $1000 in
damages to a tort victim. Notice that this business activity is inherently judgment proof: in the
event of an accident, the total assets (the $300 medallion plus the $200 cash ﬂow) are insufﬁcient
to compensate the tort victim for his loss.
For any ﬁxed level of borrowing below the total value of the assets—say $300—it is clear
that the entrepreneur would choose to ﬁnance the business with secured debt. With senior status,
the lender is guaranteed repayment of his loan in the event of an accident and is therefore
willing to issue the loan at the risk-free rate of 0%. In the event of an accident, the lender
receives the $300 taxi medallion and the tort victims claim the $200 cash ﬂow. Note that the
entrepreneur’s equity has an expected value of $180—the entrepreneur keeps the residual $200
cash ﬂow 90% of the time and keeps nothing in the event of an accident. If the debt were junior
to the tort claim, on the other hand, then the lender would not be repaid following an accident.
A face value of (approximately) $333 would allow the lender to break even in expectation,
corresponding to an interest rate of 11%.
16 What happens if the entrepreneur borrows $300 with
junior debt? In such a case, if no accident occurs, the entrepreneur’s payoff is $300 + $200 −
$333 = $167; if an accident occurs, the entrepreneur receives $0, assuming that the debt has a
junior status relative to the tort claim.
17 His expected payoff is therefore 90% of $167, or $150.
12ModiglianiandMiller’s(1958)famousresultabouttheirrelevanceofcapitalstructurefailstoholdinthepresence
of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and (as here) agency costs and strategic effects.
13Innes assumes, as we do, that the lender’s payoff must be nondecreasing in ﬁrm proﬁt. This is sensible when
lenders can sabotage the ﬁrm’s results and borrowers can misrepresent their cash ﬂows.
14InHartandMoore(1995),thehardclaimsofseniordebtdisciplinemanagerial“empirebuilding.” Thecoexistence
of multiple securities with varying durations and seniority may be due to variations in the timing of investments and
receivables and the heterogeneous preferences and monitoring abilities of investors (Tirole, 2005).
15Perotti and Spier (1993) argue that debt is an effective bargaining tool for extracting concessions from other
creditors, including labor unions. Spier and Sykes (1998) point out that senior debt can be used to steal value from tort
victims, but do not consider incentive problems. See also Ulph and Valentini (2004).
16Ninety percent of $333 is approximately $300.
17In practice, junior debtholders and tort victims receive equal treatment in bankruptcy proceedings. As discussed
later, the effect of elevating the bankruptcy status from this status is qualitatively the same. We adopt this simple notion
of junior debt for analytical and expositional ease.
C   RAND 2008.930 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Therefore, the entrepreneur’s expected payoff is $30 higher when the debt is senior to the tort
claim.
Senior debt is an effective mechanism for transferring value from the tort victims to the
entrepreneur: the entrepreneur is made better off by $30 and the tort victims are made worse off
by $30. To see this, consider the expected payments to the tort victims. When the debt is senior,
the taxi medallion is essentially taken “off the table” and the tort victims’ recovery is limited to
$200. That is, the tort victims collect $20 in expectation. When the debt is junior, on the other
hand, the tort victims can seize the taxi medallion worth $300 in addition to the $200 cash ﬂow.
So the tort victims’ recovery following an accident is $500, or $50 in expectation.
Themethodofﬁnancingdoesmorethansimplyreallocatevalueamongthedifferentplayers,
however. It can also affect the entrepreneur’s effort choice and hence the expected accident losses.
To see this, suppose that there are two levels of precaution: low and high. The low level of effort
is costless for the entrepreneur and leads to a 20% accident probability. The high level of effort
requires the entrepreneur to make a nonpecuniary investment of $18 and reduces the accident
probability to 10%. Notice that the high level of effort is socially optimal here: the entrepreneur’s
cost of effort, $18, is outweighed by the $100 reduction in the expected accident losses. It is easy
to see that, with senior debt, the entrepreneur will take the high level of precaution. The 10%
reduction in probability multiplied by the entrepreneur’s $200 out-of-pocket cost in the event of
an accident outweighs his $18 additional cost of effort. With junior debt, on the other hand, the
entrepreneur will not take the high level of precaution. Suppose he did. Recall that an 11% rate of
interest would reduce the entrepreneur’s personal stake from $200 to $167. The additional cost of
effort, $18, is higher than the beneﬁt of this effort, (0.1) ($167) = $16.7.
18 This simple example
illustrates that the entrepreneur’s preferred method of ﬁnancing—senior secured debt—is aligned
with that of society more broadly. If the entrepreneur controlled the level of ﬁnancing as well,
he would issue securities that are backed by the $200 cash ﬂow in addition to the $300 taxi
medallion and can subsequently consume (or hide) the immediate cash infusion of $200. Because
the lender expects to be repaid in full, the required rate of interest is 0%. Now the company is
totally judgment proof: there are no assets for the victims to claim in the event of an accident.
The entrepreneur takes the low level of effort here and, in a richer framework, his precautions
would be even lower than that.
What can society do to control this behavior? First, suppose that a law were passed that
elevated the status of the tort victims in bankruptcy above that of the debtholders. This effectively
forces debt into a junior position. On the positive side, this law would prevent the overleveraging
identiﬁed above. The entrepreneur will limit his borrowing to the $300 taxi medallion only.
On the negative side, however, the higher interest rate demanded by the lender implies that the
entrepreneur will take only the low level of effort. Suppose instead that the lender is held liable
for 100% of the accident victim’s losses. Assuming a high level of effort, the interest rate would
necessarily rise to 30%—the ﬁrst $300 of the $389 face value reﬂects the principal of the loan
while the remaining $89 reﬂects the lender’s expected future liability. From the entrepreneur’s
perspective, the 10% reduction in probability multiplied by his $111 loss following an accident
is outweighed by the $18 cost of effort.
19 Indeed, this example suggests that the entrepreneur’s
incentives would be even worse with lender liability.
Our proposed Limited Seniority Rule, which allows the entrepreneur to issue senior debt up
to a limit of $300 and forces further borrowing into a junior subordinated position, does better
than either of these other remedies. The entrepreneur would borrow exactly $300 and no more,
and would subsequently take the high level of precaution. The junior treatment of the additional
cash ﬂow eliminates the incentives for overborrowing because overborrowing cannot help to
shield the entrepreneur from liability. At the same time, the scheme allows for the senior status
18If the high effort cannot be supported, then the junior debtholders would demand an interest rate above 11%,
further diluting the entrepreneur’s incentives.
19If there is no accident, the lender receives the $389 face value and the ﬁrm keeps $500 − $389 = $111.
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of debt up to the level required for productive use. This means that the ﬁrm can borrow on the
terms that will leave it with the best incentives to take precautions.
3. Model
 Consider a privately owner-managed ﬁrm. The ﬁrm has a project that requires an initial
investment of k and will generate a ﬁxed future cash ﬂow of v> k. The project also potentially
causes harm to society. The magnitude of the harm, x, depends on the effort (or precaution)
chosen by the ﬁrm, e ∈ R+. Speciﬁcally, x is distributed over the interval X := [0,x], according
to a cdf F(·|e) which has positive density F(·|e) in its support. We assume that higher effort
reduces social harm in the sense of f satisfying the monotone likelihood ratio property in (− x,
e):
(MLRP)
f (x
  |e
 )
f (x |e )
<
f (x
  |e)
f (x |e)
for any x
  > x,e
  > e,x
 ,x ∈ X.
Assuming differentiability of F(·| e) with respect to e,( MLRP) implies that Fe(·|e) > 0. We
assume further that Fee ≤ 0. When taking an effort of e, the ﬁrm incurs a nonpecuniary cost of
c(e), where c(0) = 0, c
  (e) ≥ 0, c
   (e) > 0, c
  (0) = 0, and c
  (∞) =∞ . Effort is unobservable
to all parties other than the ﬁrm and cannot be directly contracted upon.
The owner-manager is liquidity constrained and ﬁnances the project with money raised
on the external capital market.
20 The capital market is perfectly competitive and the risk-free
interest rate is normalized to zero. In return for their capital investment, the outside investors
receive claims on the future cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm, v, which is fully contractible. (The speciﬁcs
of these ﬁnancial contracts are described in detail below.) The level of funds actually raised by
the owner-manager, K, may in fact exceed the amount necessary for the project, k. We assume
that any excess borrowing, K − k, can be spent quickly and efﬁciently by the owner-manager in
a way not reachable later by the tort victims or by the outside investors.
21 For instance, K − k
could be immediately consumed by the owner-manager in the form of salary or perks, or paid out
to inside shareholders in the form of dividends or special distributions.
22
Oncethecashﬂowvisgeneratedandthesocialharmxisrealized,thevictimssuefordamages
and the ﬁrm is subsequently liquidated. We assume that the tort victims receive compensatory
damages equal to their realized harm, x, whenever the ﬁrm has sufﬁcient cash ﬂows left after
repaying any seniorﬁnancial claims.Under theassumed bankruptcy rules,senior ﬁnancial claims
arepaidﬁrst,followedbythetortclaims,followedbyanyjuniorﬁnancialclaims.
23 Anyremaining
cash ﬂow that remains is subsequently enjoyed by the owner-manager.
Intheanalysisthatfollows,itissometimesusefultodistinguishtwodifferentcases.Suppose
ﬁrst ¯ x ≤ v − k. In this case, we will say that the project is not inherently judgment proof in the
sense that its cash ﬂow could reimburse both an outside investor for the minimum necessary
capital, k, and fully compensate the victims for their harms (even if the harms are at the highest
level). When ¯ x >v− k, we will say that the project is inherently judgment proof because the
ﬁrm would face insolvency if the harm were sufﬁciently large.
20The ﬁrm may have internal funds of w at its disposal for the investment, in which case the project requires total
investmentsofk +w,sothatitrequiresoutsideinvestmentofk.Inthissense,k isinterpretedtobetheminimalinvestment
to be raised outside.
21For simplicity, there is no direct efﬁciency loss associated with the excess borrowing. In practice, this may not be
thecase.Theworkingpaperversionofthisarticlegeneralizesthemodelinthisdirection.Themainresultsarequalitatively
unchanged.
22The owner-manager might lease a corporate jet or a luxurious ofﬁce, or purchase a yacht. As long as the investor
believes that the project will generate sufﬁcient cash ﬂows, v, and that he is adequately protected by the terms of his
ﬁnancial contract, the investor would be willing to lend in excess of k.
23In practice, junior debt and tort claims typically share, pro rata, in the value that remains after paying the secured
senior claims. Our framework could be adapted to consider this intermediate case without changing the main conclusions.
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TABLE 1 Payoffs under Contract r
Payoffs
Investors rS + ρ J(v − rS − x)
Tort victims min {v − rS, x}
The ﬁrm max {v − rS − ρ J(v − rS − x) − x,0 }
 Financial contracts. The ﬁrm raises capital, K, by issuing ﬁnancial claims that may vary
in their status at the time of bankruptcy. A ﬁnancial contract is formally represented as the ﬁrm’s
repayment requirement speciﬁed as a function of the cash ﬂow left after the claims with higher
status have been paid. Hence, we consider claims that are either “senior” or “junior” relative to
the claims of the tort victims.
The “senior claims” in our model are debt contracts characterized by a single repayment
amount,rS ≤v.
24 Theseclaimsarerepaidoutofthecashﬂowbeforethevictimsarecompensated.
Inpractice,seniordebtmaybesecuredbythephysicalcapitaloftheﬁrmoritsfuturecashﬂow,as
withthecaseofassetsecuritizationstrategies(i.e.,Bowiebonds).Notethatthetermsofrepayment
for these senior claims do not depend on the social harm, x. Although our focus is on ﬁnancial
contracting, our framework captures the essence of many different types of judgment-prooﬁng
strategies. For example, we can interpret the senior debt in our model as actually being equity
that is owned by a “parent,” while the ﬁrm (a “subsidiary") rents the assets from the parent and
controls the risky activity. As described in the Introduction, these asset securitization strategies
also have the feature that the assets owned by the parent are not part of a bankruptcy proceeding
when the subsidiary becomes insolvent.
“Juniorclaims”arepaidoutonlyaftertheseniorclaimsandvictimshavebeencompensated.
Their repayment amount may be a function of any remaining cash ﬂow, z = v −rS − x.F o rm a l l y ,
an arbitrary junior claim speciﬁes the payout to the investor, ρ J(v − rS − x), given a cash ﬂow
v, a senior claim rS, and a tort claim of x, where ρJ(v − rS − x) ∈ [0,max{v − rS − x,0}]. As
is standard in security design literature, we restrict the set of junior claims by requiring both the
payment to the claimant, ρ J(z), and the payment to the ﬁrm, z − ρ J(z), to be nondecreasing
in the remaining cash ﬂow z,f o rz ≥ 0. We call the set, R, of junior claims satisfying these
properties standard junior claims. All well-known junior claims belong to this set. For instance,
a typical junior debt contract with repayment rate rJ is described by ρJ(z)= :m i n{rJ,m a x{z,
0}}. An outside equity claim is described by ρJ(z) = μ max {z,0 },f o rs o m eμ ∈ (0, 1], so
again ρJ(z) ∈ R. It is easy to see that convertible debt, levered equity, call options, as well as any
mixture of these instruments generate another standard junior claim, ρJ ∈ R.
25
The ﬁrm’s repayment terms can therefore be represented by a pair, r := (rS, ρJ), such that
rs ≤ v and ρJ ∈ R. In the special case where the junior claim is a simple debt contract, we will
simply replace the second component by the repayment rate rJ (with slight abuse of notation). In
general, ﬁnancial contract r yields the ex post payoffs to the three parties as shown in Table 1.
The time line is as follows. At date T = 0, the ﬁrm chooses its ﬁnancial contract (K, r). At
date T = 1, the ﬁrm chooses effort e. At date T = 1.5, the harm x is realized. At date T = 2, the
investor is repaid and the tort victim is compensated.
24That the repayment term takes a single real number is an artifact of the deterministic cash ﬂow. If the cash
ﬂow were stochastic, the repayment would be a function, ρS(˜ v) ∈ [0, ˜ v], depending on the cash ﬂow ˜ v. With the Innes
monotonicity assumption, ρs
 (·) ∈ [0, 1], our results will remain valid. See Section 7.
25See Innes (1990) and DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) for detailed justiﬁcation of the monotonicity
assumption.
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 Welfare benchmark. Before proceeding, we establish a useful social welfare benchmark.
Assuming that the project is pursued, social welfare is simply
W(e): = v − k −

X
xf(x |e)dx − c(e).
Neither the ﬁnancial contracts nor the level of borrowing, K, inﬂuence social welfare directly.
Capitalstructurewillmatterlater,however,throughitsindirecteffectonﬁrmbehavior.Integrating
the social welfare function by parts gives
W(e): = v − k −

X
[1 − F(x |e)]dx − c(e).
Suppose that the social planner can decide how much precaution the ﬁrm should exert
directly. Differentiating W(e) shows that the ﬁrst-best precaution level, eFB, satisﬁes

X
Fe(x |e)dx − c
 (e) = 0. (1)
Throughout, we assume that W(0) ≥ 0, so the project is socially valuable even with zero effort.
This assumption will simplify our analysis and ensure that the project will be carried out in the
relevant cases studied below. We later discuss the implication of judgment prooﬁng on the project
funding decision.
4. The ﬁrm’s problem
 We now study the ﬁrm’s behavior. Although our focus in this section is to analyze its
behavior without any regulation, it is convenient for a later analysis to begin with a slightly
general framework in which the lender may be subject to some liability. Speciﬁcally, suppose
the ﬁrm picks (K,r,e) ∈ [k,v] × [0,v] × R × R+ =: F to initiate the project. We assume that,
after the lender is repaid according to r,h ei sl i a b l et op a y  (x) when the harm x is realized,
where   (·) is assumed to be nondecreasing. Then, the lender’s ex post payoff is
π(x,r, ): = rS + ρJ(v − rS − x) −  (x), (2)
whenharmxisrealized.Ifthelenderexpectstheﬁrmtochoosee,thenhisexantepayoffbecomes
 (r,e; ): =

X
π(x;r, ) f (x |e)dx.
Meanwhile, the ﬁrm receives an ex post payoff of
u(x;r): = max{v − rS − ρJ(v − rS − x) − x,0}, (3)
so its ex ante payoff given effort e is
U(K,r,e): = K − k +

X
u(x;r) f (x |e)dx − c(e).
The ﬁrm then faces the problem
[P( )] max
(K,r,e)∈F
U(K,r,e)
subject to
(IR)  (r,e; ) ≥ K
and
(IC) e ∈ argmax
e ∈R+
U(K,r,e
 ).
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Condition (IR) ensures that the lender breaks even from the ﬁnancial contract (K, r),
when the ﬁrm is expected to choose effort e. Condition (IC) means that the ﬁrm must have the
incentive to choose e, facing the ﬁnancial contract (K, r). This is a constraint because the ﬁrm
cannot commit to a level of precaution ex ante, even though it may wish to do so.
26 We say that
(K,r,e) ∈ F is feasible if it satisﬁes both (IR) and (IC) and optimal for the ﬁrm if it solves the
program [P( )].
 The unregulated behavior of the ﬁrm. We now analyze the unregulated behavior of the
ﬁrm. Formally, we consider [P(0)]: that is, no restriction is placed on the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial decision
making (i.e., the amount of borrowing and its choice of ﬁnancing instruments), and the lender
bears no liability (i.e.,   (·) = 0). Therefore, the ﬁrm is free to choose the amount of borrowing,
K,theﬁnancing instruments,r, and itsprecaution level, e. Beforeproceeding, wecharacterize the
optimal ﬁnancial structure for the ﬁrm and its incentive to take precautions, given that ﬁnancial
structure.
Lemma 1 (Optimality of senior debt). For any feasible (K, r, e) with a non-debt structure r,
there exists a feasible (K, ˆ r, ˆ e), with an all-debt structure ˆ r, which the ﬁrm prefers over (K, r, e).
For any feasible (K, r, e) with an all-debt structure with rJ > 0, there exists a feasible (K, ˆ r, ˆ e),
with a senior-debt-only structure with ˆ rJ = 0, which the ﬁrm prefers over (K, r, e). In each case,
a shift to any such preferred feasible structure leads to a (weakly) higher level of precaution.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 tells us that, holding the level of capital ﬁxed at K, it is both privately and socially
optimal for the ﬁrm to choose a senior-debt-only structure.
27 As mentioned above, the private
optimality of senior debt stems from its effectiveness as a judgment-prooﬁng device. To illustrate
theroleofseniority,supposeﬁrstthattheﬁrmborrowsK with(only)juniordebtwiththepayment
rate of rJ. Assume v − rJ < x so that insolvency arises with positive probability, in which case
the (junior) creditor does not always receive her payment rJ. This scenario is depicted in Figure
1, which plots the payouts to different parties as functions of x.
For a given level of harm, x, the tort victim is paid min {x, v}, the junior creditor is paid
min {rJ,m a x{v − x,0 }}, and the ﬁrm receives max {v − x − rJ,0 } (gross of effort cost). The
areas, weighted by the densities, represent the expected payments to different parties. Notice that
the repayment rate, rJ, must be inﬂated to reﬂect the risk of nonrepayment: rJ >K.
Suppose instead that the ﬁrm borrows K with senior debt, assuming for a moment the same
payment rate rS = rJ >K. The ﬁrm would still receive max {v − x − rJ,0 }, but the rent is
redistributed from the tort victim to the lender: the lender now receives rJ >K with certainty
and the tort victim receives the remainder, min {x, v − rJ}. This redistributed rent can be easily
shifted to the ﬁrm. Because the lender would receive a strictly higher payoff with senior rather
than junior debt (holding the repayment rate ﬁxed), she can be persuaded to charge a lower rate.
In fact, the competitive capital market would drive the repayment rate down to a level that allows
the lender to break even: rS = K. This is shown in Figure 2.
The ﬁrm extracts all of the redistributed rents, that is, the entire gain from diluting the tort
claims. Nevertheless, Lemma 1 suggests that this judgment-prooﬁng strategy is socially desirable
because the ﬁrm chooses a higher level of precaution with senior debt than with junior debt (or
other junior claims). A senior claimant is assured repayment of the loan, unlike junior claimants,
so the former charges a lower repayment rate than the latter. Hence, the ﬁrm is less likely to be
insolvent with senior debt. Comparing Figure 1 to Figure 2 shows that, with senior debt, the ﬁrm
26(IC) may bind because, starting at the solution of the relaxed program ignoring (IC), it may pay the ﬁrm to
change e in a way violating (IR).
27There are additional costs associated with high leverage that are beyond the scope of this article. The borrower
may succumb to moral hazard and ignore the maintenance of the ﬁrm’s assets, for example, whereas the lender may lack
the expertise to monitor the borrower effectively. See Tirole (2005).
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FIGURE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF PAYOFFS UNDER JUNIOR DEBT
FIGURE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF PAYOFFS UNDER SENIOR DEBT
is a residual claimant in more states of nature and thus has a greater incentive to reduce the harm
to the tort victims.
Given Lemma 1, we can restrict attention to the senior-debt-only ﬁnancial structure for the
ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm issues senior debt with any K ∈ [k,v], the break-even repayment rate is simply
rS = K because the debtholder has seniority over tort victims. From (3) above, the ﬁrm’s ex post
payoff is
u0(x; K): = u(x; K,0) = max{v − K − x,0}. (4)
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Hence, its ex ante payoff given effort e is
U0(K,e): = K − k +
 v−K
0
(v − K − x) f (x |e)dx − c(e) = K − k +
 v−K
0
F(x |e)dx − c(e),
where the equality follows from integration by parts.
Theunregulatedbehavioroftheﬁrm,(K 0,e0),mustthenmaximizeU 0(K,e).Thebehavioris
characterized asfollows.Given anyefforte,theﬁrm’smarginal beneﬁt fromraisingitsborrowing
is
∂U0(K,e)
∂K
= 1 − F(v − K |e). (5)
This expression reveals the judgment-prooﬁng beneﬁt of overborrowing. Whenever the ﬁrm is
insolvent (i.e., x >v − k), the additional repayment to the lender comes out of the fund that
would have been used for the tort award, given the seniority of the debt. Hence, essentially, each
additional dollar borrowed is paid out of the tort victims’ pockets with probability 1 − F(v −
K |e). Consequently, the marginal beneﬁt of increasing the senior debt is strictly positive for any
K <v, which implies that the ﬁrm will borrow K 0 = v.
The implication forﬁrmprecaution isquiteclear. Given any K ∈[k,v],theﬁrm’sprecaution
level e0(K) is determined by
∂U0(K,e)
∂e
=
 v−K
0
Fe(x |e)dx − c
 (e) = 0. (6)
Because ∂
2U 0(K, e)/∂e∂K =−Fe(v − K |e) < 0 for any K <v , e0(·) is strictly decreasing in
range. In words, an increased senior debt lowers the ﬁrm’s exposure to tort liability, reducing its
incentive for precaution. In fact, as is clear from (6), given K = v, the ﬁrm has no incentive for
any precaution, that is, e0(v) = 0.
Proposition 1. Without any policy intervention, the ﬁrm borrows K 0 = v with senior debt and
takes no precautions, e0 = 0.
Note that even when the ﬁrm is not inherently judgment proof (x ≤ v − k), it creates
“artiﬁcial” judgment proofness by borrowing up to its cash ﬂow.
5. Public policy responses
 This section considers several remedies to the judgment-proof problem, including extending
liability beyond the injurer to the lenders and senioritizing the bankruptcy status of tort claims.
Thesetworemediesshareacommonpurposeofexpandingtherecoveryofdamagesforthevictims
from a judgment-proof injurer. They may differ, however, in their incentives for precaution taking
andborrowing.Inordertomeaningfullycomparetheseremedies,weﬁrstestablishamorerealistic
welfare benchmark than the one established before.
 Welfare target with moral hazard. Suppose the social planner controls all aspects of the
ﬁrm’s behavior, except for its precaution decision. Speciﬁcally, the planner chooses the amount
of borrowing K ≥ k, and the terms of the ﬁnancial contract, r, for the ﬁrm. She also imposes
a liability of  (·) on the lender, where  (·) is nonnegative and nondecreasing. We denote the set
of feasible liability rules by L. These choices are subject only to the constraints that the lender
must break even (i.e., (IR)) and the ﬁrm must have incentive to choose the precaution the planner
wishes to implement (i.e., (IC)). Formally, the social planner would solve
[SW]m a x
(K,r,e, )
W(K,e)
subject to
(K,r,e) ∈ F satisﬁes (IR) and (IC), and   ∈ L.
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Although the regulators probably do not have either the information or the power to control
the amount of borrowing or the terms of ﬁnancial contracts of ﬁrms, the program [SW] yields a
morerealisticwelfaretargetthantheﬁrst-bestlevel.Thenextpropositioncharacterizestheoptimal
borrowing and precaution behavior, (K
∗, e
∗), that the planner would wish to implement.
Proposition 2 (Constrained efﬁciency). The solution of the problem [SW]i n v o l v e sK
∗ = k and
e
∗ = e0(k). No liability is imposed on the lenders,  (x) = 0, and the ﬁnancial contract involves
only senior debt, r = (k,0 ) .
This result suggests that the underprovision of effort chosen by the unregulated ﬁrm is
attributed entirely to its excess borrowing. Had the ﬁrm borrowed K = k, then the ﬁrm would
have chosen the (constrained) efﬁcient level of precaution e0(k). The reason is the following.
The unregulated ﬁrm dilutes the tort claims by choosing senior debt and by borrowing beyond
the necessary level. For a ﬁxed level of borrowing, senior debt improves incentives (Lemma 1).
Excessive borrowing, however, worsens the incentives.
We will now show that subordination and lender liability serve to curb excessive borrowing
but introduce their own problems.
 Mandatory subordination. Under mandatory subordination, all ﬁnancial claims are
restricted to be junior to the tort claims in their bankruptcy priority. Given the junior status
of the debt, the tort victims have priority, meaning that they will receive up to the level allowed
by the cash ﬂow, or min {v, x}. This means that raising the level of borrowing cannot help the
ﬁrm to avoid tort liability. Mandatory subordination controls the overleveraging problem, with
the ﬁrm choosing Ksub = k.
GivenStep2ofLemma1
  (seetheAppendix),theﬁrmprefersjuniordebtamongallstandard
junior claims. The equilibrium repayment rate, rsub, and the ﬁrm’s equilibrium effort choice, esub,
are determined jointly. Given the effort esub, the repayment rate rsub must be chosen to satisfy the
lender’s break-even condition (IR),
 v
0
min{rsub,v− x} f (x |esub)dx = k. (7)
Given the repayment rate, rsub, the effort choice esub must satisfy the ﬁrm (IC), or the associated
ﬁrst-order condition,
 v−rsub
0
Fe(x |esub)dx = c
 (esub). (8)
The equilibrium outcome depends on whether the project is inherently judgment proof. If
it is not inherently judgment proof, the investor can break even with the repayment of k,s o
rsub = k. Then, because v − k ≥ x, (8) coincides with (1), which implies that the ﬁrm will choose
the ﬁrst-best effort eFB. Hence, mandatory subordination implements the social optimum in this
case. If the project is inherently judgment proof, however, the lender must charge rsub >k to break
even. This means that the ﬁrm is more likely to be insolvent relative to the senior debt case, thus
leading to too little precaution, that is, esub < e0(k). Hence, the constrained efﬁcient precaution
level, e
∗ = e0(k), is not attainable by subordination. In either case, because W(0) ≥ 0 and because
the ﬁrm does not fully compensate the tort victims, the joint payoff for the ﬁrm and the lender
is nonnegative, so the project will be ﬁnanced. In particular, rsub <v . It then follows from (8)
that esub > 0. Recall that, without subordination, the ﬁrm would overborrow to its cash ﬂow limit,
K 0 = v, and choose no precaution. Hence, the debt subordination would clearly improve welfare.
The results are summarized as follows.
Proposition 3. Suppose the ﬁrm is allowed to employ only (standard) junior claims. Then,
the ﬁrm never borrows more than k, but chooses too little precaution esub < e
∗ if the project
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FIGURE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF PAYOFFS UNDER LENDER LIABILITY
is inherently judgment proof. Subordination improves social welfare (relative to unregulated
behavior).
In sum, subordination trades off two sources of precaution incentives. On the one hand, it
eliminates overleveraging, which improves the ﬁrm’s precaution incentives. But at the same time,
the switch from senior to junior debt worsens the ﬁrm’s incentives.
 Lender liability. Now suppose that the lender bears the entire residual liability for the
damages suffered by the tort victims when the ﬁrm is unable to compensate them ex post.
Because the additional liability imposed on the lender causes him to raise its repayment rate
to a point that will allow him to break even, the liability is in fact shifted to the ﬁrm ex
ante.
At ﬁrst glance, lender liability looks similar to debt subordination. As before, the ﬁrm thus
cannot avoid liability by raising its debt, so the ﬁrm would never borrow more than its productive
use, that is, Kll = k. If the social harm never exceeds the cash ﬂow (x ≤ v), then lender liability is
precisely the same as debt subordination. When the harm level may exceed the cash ﬂow (x >v ),
however, then lender liability and debt subordination generate different incentives for care. In
such a case, the lenders have far more to lose with unlimited lender liability: in addition to the
risk of nonrepayment of principal and interest, they also run the risk that the tort victims will sue
them and recover damages from the lender’s personal assets. The additional liability of the lender
is depicted in Figure 3 as the triangle above the cash ﬂow v.
28
Anticipating higher future liability, the lenders would require an interest rate that is even
higher than the rate with subordination, rll >rsub. This clearly reduces the ﬁrm’s equity stake,
further diluting the incentives for care.
28If the harm never exceeds the cash ﬂow (i.e., ¯ x ≤ v), then the additional liability triangle in Figure 2 disappears,
so lender liability coincides with subordination.
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To be more precise, let (rll, ell) be the equilibrium repayment rate and precaution choice
under lender liability, assuming that the project will be ﬁnanced. As before, we have
 x
0
min{rll,v− x} f (x |ell)dx = k, (9)
and
 v−rll
0
Fe(x |ell)dx = c
 (ell). (10)
If x ≤ v, then comparing (7) with (9) conﬁrms that rll = rsub,s oell = esub.I fx >v , however, the
extra liability borne by the lender causes him to charge a higher rate, or rll >rsub, which means
that the ﬁrm is more likely to be insolvent, and thus will have a lower incentive for precaution,
that is, ell < esub. In either case, our assumption of W(0) ≥ 0 ensures that the project will be
initially launched and that rll ≤ v and ell ≥ 0.
Proposition4. If x ≤ v,thenunlimitedlenderliabilityyieldsthesameoutcomeassubordination.
If x >v , then unlimited lender liability induces lower precautions than subordination. In either
case, the ﬁrm never borrows more than k. Lender liability improves social welfare relative to
unregulated behavior.
Whereas lender liability and debt subordination are equally effective at eliminating
overleveraging, the incentive problem is more pronounced with lender liability. Intuitively, the
lender faces liability risks in addition to the risk of nonrepayment of principal and interest, and
the higher interest rate required by the lender exacerbates the incentive problem. It is worth
highlighting that the beneﬁt of lender liability arises only due to the ﬁrm’s strategic judgment
prooﬁng, in the form of overleveraging. Lender liability is never beneﬁcial if the ﬁrm’s borrowing
is ﬁxed at k. Further, the beneﬁt of deterring overleveraging applies only to senior claims. If all
claims were junior (for instance, because the ﬁrm has no securable asset), there would be no
beneﬁt from lender liability in our model.
Corollary 1. If the ﬁrm can only issue (standard) junior claims, then lender liability can only
worsen the incentive for precaution taking, strictly so if x >v .
Proof. If the ﬁrm can only use junior claims, then it would use only junior debt (by Step 2 of
Lemma1
 ).Hence,thecasewithoutlenderliabilitywouldcoincidewithmandatorysubordination.
The result then follows because mandatory subordination (strictly) dominates lender liability (if
x >v ).
This same logic would apply to placing liability on outside equityholders. An outside
equityholder, anticipating future liability for the misconduct of the entrepreneur, would demand a
greater proportion of the ﬁrm’s equity in return. This would leave the entrepreneur with a smaller
proportion of the equity, diluting his incentives for care.
We next propose a liability rule that does attain constrained efﬁciency.
 Optimal liability scheme: limited seniority rule. We now introduce a liability rule, called
theLimitedSeniorityRule,thatimplementstheconstrainedefﬁcientoutcome,(K
∗,e
∗),asdeﬁned
in Proposition 2. Under this rule, a ﬁnancial claim’s “seniority” is honored only up to a certain
limit, k. Suppose that a ﬁrm borrowed K >k with senior debt. In the bankruptcy court, only the
amount k would be treated as “senior” debt, having a priority over tort claims. The remaining
portion, K − k, would be treated as junior debt. Equivalently, this rule requires that the ﬁnancial
claims on the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow be “junior” up to v − k, while the remaining portion of cash ﬂow,
k, may be distributed according to the standard Absolute Priority Rule.
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Theeffectofthisrulecanbeanalyzedasfollows.First,notethatourearlierresultconcerning
the private optimality of senior debt (i.e., Lemma 1
 ) extends to this rule, so there is no loss in
restrictingattentiontoseniordebt.Hence,supposetheﬁrmobtainsseniordebtwith K ≥k.Gi v en
an equilibrium repayment rate ˆ r(K), the lender will receive

min{ˆ r(K),v− x} if x ≤ v − k,
k otherwise.
Given that the lender anticipates the ﬁrm to choose ˆ e(K), the lender breaks even if
ˆ r(K)F(v − ˆ r(K)| ˆ e(K)) +
 v−k
v−ˆ r(K)
(v − x) f (x | ˆ e(K))dx + k(1 − F(v − k | ˆ e(K))) = K.(11)
Meanwhile, the ﬁrm’s incentive compatibility requires
 v−ˆ r(K)
0
Fe(x | ˆ e(K))dx − c
 (ˆ e(K)) = 0. (12)
Observe from (11) that ˆ r(k) = k. That is, if the ﬁrm borrows the productive requirement, k,i t
does not bear any additional liability, so the repayment rate of k will break even. Substituting
ˆ r(k) = k into (12) shows that the ﬁrm’s precaution choice will be constrained efﬁcient, that is,
ˆ e(k) = e
∗.
We now show that the ﬁrm would never borrow more than k. Suppose that the ﬁrm did in
fact borrow K >k. Then, the ﬁrm’s ex ante payoff will be (with integration by parts)
ˆ U(K) = K − k +
 v−ˆ r(K)
0
F(x | ˆ e(K))dx − c(ˆ e(K)).
Differentiate this with respect to K, using the envelope theorem, to obtain
ˆ U
 (K) = 1 − F(v − ˆ r(K)| ˆ e(K))ˆ r
 (K). (13)
Next, differentiate totally (11) to obtain
F(v − ˆ r(K)| ˆ e(K))ˆ r
 (K) +
 v−k
v−ˆ r(K)
Fe(x | ˆ e(K))dx

ˆ e
 (K) = 1. (14)
Substituting (14) into (13) gives
ˆ U
 (K) =
 v−k
v−ˆ r(K)
Fe(x | ˆ e(K))dx

ˆ e
 (K) < 0,
where the last inequality holds because Fe > 0 and e
  (K) ≤ 0. Because the inequality yields a
contradiction, we conclude that the ﬁrm never borrows more than k. The following conclusion is
then immediate.
Proposition 5. The Limited Seniority Rule that treats any borrowing beyond a limit, k, as junior
to the tort claim implements the constrained efﬁcient outcome (K, e) = (k, e
∗).
When compared with mandatory subordination and lender liability, the Limited Seniority
Rule involves less compensation to the tort victims ex post. Nevertheless, the rule generates the
best incentives for precautions by the ﬁrm. Also note that our rule respects absolute priority (up
to a limit), and therefore implies less interference with the existing bankruptcy priority rules.
In practice, the exact seniority limit k may not be perfectly observable by the policymaker,
so the latter may err either by being too generous or too stingy in her treatment of debt seniority.
The Limited Seniority Rule is forgiving of such errors, however, in that its relative desirability
is robust to even large errors. To see this, observe that mandatory subordination is a special case
of the current rule where the seniority limit is set at zero, forcing all borrowing to be junior to
the tort claim. The Limited Seniority Rule with a limit set (inaccurately) in (0, k) will clearly
dominate mandatory subordination and thus also lender liability. Likewise, the Limited Seniority
Rule will dominate unregulated behavior as long as the limit is set in (k, K 0). Consequently, for
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a very broad range of “inaccurate” limits, the rule will produce a better outcome than mandatory
subordination, lender liability, or no regulation at all. In particular, in the absence of an accurate
estimate of k, a conservative approach that would limit “seniority” to the debt associated with
initial setup investment will outperform the mandatory subordination and at the same time will
prevent the overleveraging problem.
6. Other remedies
 The three remedies to the judgment-proof problem discussed so far—debt subordination,
lender liability, and limited seniority—all have focused on debt contracts and the regulation
of bankruptcy. We will now discuss additional remedies—partial lender liability, shareholder
liability, mandatory liability insurance, and punitive damages.
 Partial lender liability. Pitchford (1995) and Boyer and Laffont (1997) advocate the idea
of holding the lender partially liable for the social harm. Our Limited Seniority Rule can be
interpreted in this light, because exposing part of the ﬁnancial claim to tort victims is a way of
holding the lender partially liable. Speciﬁcally, the constrained optimum can be implemented by
holding the lender liable for  (x;K, k) = min {max {x − (v − K), 0}, K − k} (without any debt
subordination). Notice that, given our judgment-prooﬁng issue, the extent of the lender’s liability
must vary with the extent of borrowing, which differs from the existing proposals.
Alternatively, one could set the lender liability equal to min {x, v − k}, as proposed
by Pitchford (1995). Indeed, the constrained optimum would be obtained if the debt contract
required the ﬁrm to reimburse min {x, v − k} to the lender in the event of an accident.
29 Note
that the repayment rate is decreasing in v − x. This makes the contract nonstandard, violating our
“monotonicity” assumption. Interestingly, if the parties could contract on x, then partial lender
liability would no longer be optimal. The social planner could achieve an even better outcome
by raising the lender liability beyond v − k, possibly up to full liability. For instance, with full
lender liability, the lender may induce the ﬁrm to choose eFB by charging less than k when there
is no accident and more than k + x when there is an accident.
30
 Shareholderliability.Ourmodelhasveryimportantimplicationsforshareholderliability.
31
First, policies that allow tort victims to seize the entrepreneur’s personal assets—home equity
and retirement plans, for example—would lead to improved incentives for care. Facing personal
liability, the entrepreneur would better internalize the harms that he causes to society. Whether
outside shareholders should be held liable depends on their ability to inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s behavior
viamonitoringorsophisticatedcontracting.Iftheyhavesufﬁcientcontrolovertheﬁrm’sbehavior,
shareholder liability may be desirable.
32 More realistically, though, outside shareholders tend to
be passive, lacking such an ability. In that case, outside equityholders’ liability would worsen the
entrepreneur’s incentives rather than improve them. An outside equityholder, anticipating future
liability for tort damages beyond his equity stake, would demand a greater proportion of the
company’s stock to compensate for that risk. (This greater proportion of stock is analogous to the
higher interest rate that would be demanded by debtholders in the case of lender liability.) The
entrepreneur is left with a smaller equity stake than otherwise, and hence less of an incentive to
take precautions to avoid future liability. In fact, the logic of Lemma 1 implies that the ﬁrm’s
precaution incentive would be even worse under this regime than under lender liability. This
insight provides some support for the rule of limited liability in U.S. corporate law.
29The senior repayment rate depends on the harm x, which is assumed away in our model.
30This problem does not arise in Pitchford (1995) due to the binary state. See also Lewis and Sappington (2001).
31See Hansmann and Kraakman (1991), who argue that the prevailing rule of limited liability for corporation offers
few, if any, advantages over a rule of unlimited liability.
32As noted earlier, third-party liability leads to the constrained optimum when the third party can charge the ﬁrm
reimbursement contingent on the level of social harm. In this vein, Pitchford (1993) established equivalence between
outside shareholder responsibility, mandatory insurance, and third-party superfund scheme.
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 Mandatory liability insurance. Mandating that the injurers purchase liability insurance is
a simple way of ensuring the tort victims’ recovery of their court awards. As Pitchford (1993)
and Shavell (2005) observe, if a full-insurance provider can monitor and control the injurer’s
precaution level (say by conditioning its payout or insurance premium on this level), the provider
will require the ﬁrm to choose a socially efﬁcient level of precaution. In practice, however,
insurance providers are unlikely to possess fully effective monitoring capabilities. For instance, in
the context of the taxi accidents, precautions would take the form of a taxi company’s screening
for careful drivers at the hiring stage and monitoring their driving practices. Such intimate
involvement with the management of the business is often beyond the expertise of insurance
providers. Without monitoring, liability insurance would lead to higher insurance premiums and
would reduce the injurer’s precautions. Moreover, if the liability insurance coverage were partial
rather than full, so the ﬁrm’s assets were partially exposed to tort victims, then the ﬁrm would still
borrow excessively to completely judgment proof itself. With complete insurance coverage, there
would be no need for further judgment prooﬁng. Either way, the ﬁrm has no incentive to invest
in precautions, for it is completely shielded from ex post liability. In other words, the standard
moral hazard problem associated with insurance compounds the judgment-proof problem, which
aggravates the incentives.
 Damage inﬂation: punitive damages. The merits of punitive damages have been widely
debated among legal scholars (see Polinsky and Shavell, 1998 for a survey). Because judgment
proofness typically leaves victims undercompensated, punitive damages may be one possible
way to hold the judgment-proof defendant accountable. Although inﬂating damages does little to
extract payment from a bankrupt injurer, it raises the payment when the injurer is not bankrupt.
This is not necessarily a good thing, however (see Boyd and Ingberman, 1994, 1999). First,
damage inﬂation has a dubious effect on incentives in the presence of exogenous judgment
proofness. Damage inﬂation increases damage payments when the harms to society are very
low—namely when the injurer is solvent whether or not the damages are inﬂated. Hence, damage
inﬂation imposes a greater punishment in exactly those states of nature that society would like to
encourage. Second, inﬂating damages creates more temptation for the ﬁrm to resort to judgment
prooﬁng. Inﬂated damages mean that the injurer has more to lose in the solvent state, thus
motivating her to shield her asset by judgment prooﬁng. In sum, inﬂating damages does not seem
useful in the context of judgment proofness and judgment prooﬁng.
7. Extensions
 Richer contracting possibilities and lender monitoring. We have considered a broad set
of ﬁnancing contracts that encompass most of the commonly observed ﬁnancing arrangements.
It is of (at least theoretical) interest to consider even richer contracting possibilities. For example,
we can imagine junior claims that do not satisfy the monotonicity properties assumed in R,o r
senior claims whose payment requirements depend on realized harm x, or the investor may be
able to monitor the ﬁrm’s effort. Although contracts outside R are not common in reality, they
are at least theoretically interesting because often such contracts may dominate the ones in R in
performance.
33
As pointed out by Boyer and Laffont (1997), the improved contracting between the lender
and the ﬁrm makes it more desirable to regulate the lender.
34 This is true even in the presence
of judgment prooﬁng. Without any regulation, the lender’s improved ability to control the ﬁrm’s
behavior via sophisticated monitoring and contracting will simply enable them to promote their
33Innes (1990) shows that a ﬁnancial claim which charges high repayment when the cash ﬂow is low and a lower
repayment when the cash ﬂow is high does better than a debt. See Lewis and Sappington (2001) for a similar point.
34A related counterpoint is made by Hiriart and Martimort (2006), who study extended liability in the presence
of public regulation of the ﬁrm. They ﬁnd that incompleteness of regulatory contracts makes extending liability more
desirable.
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joint interest more effectively. They will engage in a variety of judgment-prooﬁng strategies
to simultaneously create more ﬁrm value and protect that value from the reach of future tort
victims. The policy interventions discussed above—subordination, lender liability, and limited
seniority—all force the lender and the ﬁrm to jointly internalize the social harm they cause. An
improved contract between the two parties enables them to implement the level of precaution in
their best joint interest, and these policies can better align their joint interest with social welfare.
As with Boyer and Laffont (1997), if the lender can monitor the ﬁrm’s precaution accurately, the
agency problem between the two parties disappears. In this case, full lender liability will yield the
ﬁrst-best outcome: the ﬁrm will borrow K = k with a contract that punishes the ﬁrm whenever
it does not pick the ﬁrst-best effort level.
 Victim precautions. Our analysis has assumed that only the ﬁrm can take precautions to
avoid accidents. In reality, potential victims can also take precautions to avoid accidents and to
mitigate their damages in the event that they do occur. In the taxi cab example, pedestrians can
be more careful when walking near trafﬁc. Policies that “make the victim whole” following an
accident—such as unlimited lender liability—will lead the victim to take too little care.
35 Debt
subordination performs better than unlimited lender liability in this regard. Because the victim
bears a residual loss with debt subordination, the victim takes a higher level of care. Because
the tort victim bears an even higher loss when debt is senior rather than junior, our Limited
Seniority Rule performs best of all. With the Limited Seniority Rule, the junior status of the tort
victim encourages greater care levels by the victim, and the lower interest rate encourages greater
precautions by the ﬁrm.
 Uncertain cash ﬂows and capital requirements. Thus far, we have assumed that the cash
ﬂow, v, is deterministic and the productive requirement, k, is known. These assumptions, made
primarily for simplicity, may not hold in reality. Our results are largely robust to relaxing these
assumptions,however.Supposethecashﬂowv isarandomvariable.Innes(1990)showsthatdebt
is preferable to all other standard (i.e., “monotonic”) ﬁnancial claims (which, as noted earlier,
include all plausible ﬁnancial claims) in a model without tort victims, so there would be little
loss in restricting attention to senior debt. More importantly, the ﬁrm’s preference for senior debt
over junior claims and its tendency for overleveraging remain unchanged in this case, because
the “judgment-prooﬁng” beneﬁts of these practices do not depend on the stochastic nature of the
cash ﬂow. Hence, the ﬁrm will choose senior secured debt and borrow in excess of its productive
use. Some of the remedies to this problem—namely subordination and lender liability—will lead
to the same tradeoffs as discussed before. The optimality of the Limited Seniority Rule extend to
this new environment, except that the scope of the “junior treatment,” v − k, would be random
instead of deterministic.
 Activity levels. We have so far assumed that the ﬁrm’s activity is socially justiﬁed even
when it exerts no precaution. Relaxing this assumption identiﬁes an additional role for regulation.
Supposetheﬁrm’sactivityissufﬁcientlyharmfulthatitissociallyunjustiﬁable,withoutsufﬁcient
precaution.Withoutanyregulation,thevariousjudgment-prooﬁngstrategiescouldenabletheﬁrm
to engage in harmful activities even without any precaution. The public policies discussed above
may regulate the ﬁrm’s activity decisions. For instance, in the perfect contracting environment,
full lender liability will force the ﬁrm and the lender to internalize the social harm caused by their
activity, resulting in the optimal decision. As Boyer and Laffont (1997) note, if there is moral
hazard or adverse selection in the investment, however, full lender liability may prevent even a
socially justiﬁable project from being pursued. Such problems may render partial lender liability
or the Limited Seniority Rule optimal.
35The law and economics literature has suggested various solutions to these so-called bilateral accidents, including
contributorynegligence.Ourframeworkassumesthattheﬁrm’seffortlevelisunobservableandnotcontractible,preventing
the implementation of these negligence rules.
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8. Conclusion
 This article has considered the problem faced by an entrepreneur when raising capital to
ﬁnance a risky business activity. In order to shield his assets from future tort claimants, and to
secure capital at lower cost, the entrepreneur has a strong incentive to issue claims that are senior
to any future claims by tort victims. Holding the level of borrowing ﬁxed, the entrepreneur’s
private decision to use senior debt is also socially desirable: senior debt leads to higher levels
of precaution and hence a higher social surplus than either junior debt or outside equity. The
entrepreneur will tend to borrow too much, however, and this leads to lower precautions. Public
policies that prevent strategic judgment prooﬁng may or may not be in society’s interest ex ante.
Debt subordination and lender liability both eliminate overleveraging. By itself, this is a good
thing: lower levels of borrowing implies higher levels of precaution. But holding the level of
borrowing as ﬁxed, both policies lead to suboptimal precautions and higher levels of social harm
(lender liability performing worst). The Limited Seniority Rule allows senior debt only up to a
predetermined limit, and thus limits the scope of the elevation of the torts’ bankruptcy status.
Although least protective of the interest of tort claimants compared with other policies, this rule
achieves the constrained social optimum: it prevents overleveraging and also creates the highest
achievable incentives for care.
The main lesson of our article is that ﬁrms, when left unregulated, will tend to engage in
judgment-prooﬁng strategies. These strategies not only leave the victims undercompensated, they
alsoleadtheﬁrmstotaketoofewprecautionstoavoidcausingharm.Althoughourarticlefocused
primarilyonﬁnancial strategies,namelytheﬁrm’schoiceofcapitalstructureandsecuritization,it
would be interesting to more formally explore other judgment-prooﬁng strategies such as vertical
and horizontal disintegration. Whereas our analysis suggests that regulating such practices may
be socially desirable, the precise form and degree of regulation requires careful assessment of the
incentives facing the ﬁrm and is left for future research.
Appendix
 We prove a more general version of Lemma 1 for any nondecreasing   (·) ≥ 0, Lemma 1 .
Proof of Lemma 1
 . The proof of the ﬁrst statement consists of two steps:
Step 1. Consider any all-debt ﬁnancial structure, (K, r), with r = (rS, rJ). Given such a structure, the ﬁrm’s
choice of precaution is unique and nonincreasing in the sumrS +rJ, and the surplus the ﬁrm collects is strictly decreasing
in rS + rJ for rS + rJ ∈ (0, v).
Proof. Fix any all-debt ﬁnancial structure, (K, r), with r = (rS, rJ). Given the structure, if the ﬁrm picks e, it collects
the utility of
U(K,r,e) = K − k +
 x
0
max{v − rS − rJ − x,0} f (x |e)dx − c(e).
Integrating by parts, this can be rewritten as
U(K,r,e) = K − k +
 v−rS−rJ
0
F(x |e)dx − c(e).
Given the assumptions made on F(x|·)a n dc(·), U(K, r, ·) is strictly concave and admits an interior maximizer. Further,
the function satisﬁes a single crossing property with respect to (− rS − rJ, e), hence, the maximizer, ¯ e(rS + rJ), of U(K,
r, ·) must be nonincreasing in rS + rJ.L e tU(rS + rJ): = maxe∈R+{K − k +
 v−rS−rJ
0 F(x |e)dx − c(e)} be the associated
maximized value. By the envelope theorem, for rS + rJ ∈ (max{0,v− x},v),
U
 (rS + rJ) =− F(v − rS − rJ | ¯ e(rS + rJ)) < 0,
which proves the last statement.
Step 2. For any feasible (K, r, e) with non-debt structure there exists a feasible (K, ˆ r, ˆ e) with all-debt structure
ˆ r, which the ﬁrm prefers over (K, r, e). A shift to any feasible all-debt structure that the ﬁrm prefers results in a (weakly)
higher precaution.
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Proof. Fix any (K, r, e) with non-debt structure (i.e., ρ  ≡ 0,ρ∈ R), satisfying (IR)a n d(IC). We consider an all-debt
structure (K, ˆ r, with ˆ r := (rS, ˆ rJ)), where ˆ rJ is chosen so that
 (ˆ r,e, ) =  (r,e, ),
⇔
 v−rS−ˆ rJ
0
min{ˆ rJ,v− rS − x}dF(x |e) =
 x
0
ρ(v − rS − x)dF(x |e). (A1)
Becauseρ ∈ R, ˆ rJ exists(recallthepropertiesofR).Further,thereexists ˆ x ∈ [0,v− rS]suchthatmin{ˆ rJ,v− rS − x}≤
ρ(v − rS − x)ifx ≤ ˆ x andmin{ˆ rJ,v− rS − x}≥ρ(v − rS − x)ifx ≥ ˆ x (whichagainfollowsfromthefactthatρ ∈ R).
For any e  < e,
U(K, ˆ r,e ) − U(K,r,e )
=
 v−rS
0
[ρ(v − rS − x) − min{ˆ rJ,v− rS − x}] f (x |e
 )dx
=
 ˆ x
0
[ρ(v − rS − x) − min{ˆ rJ,v− rS − x}] f (x |e
 )dx
+
 v−rS
ˆ x
[ρ(v − rS − x) − min{ˆ rJ,v− rS − x}] f (x |e
 )dx
=
 ˆ x
0
[ρ(v − rS − x) − min{ˆ rJ,v− rS − x}] f (x |e)

f (x |e )
f (x |e)

dx
+
 v−r
ˆ x
[ρ(v − rS − x) − min{ˆ rJ,v− rS − x}] f (x |e)

f (x |e )
f (x |e)

dx
≤
 ˆ x
0
[ρ(v − rS − x) − min{ˆ rJ,v− rS − x}] f (x |e)

f (ˆ x |e )
f (ˆ x |e)

dx
+
 v−r
ˆ x
[ρ(v − rS − x) − min{ˆ rJ,v− rS − x}] f (x |e)

f (ˆ x |e )
f (ˆ x |e)

dx
=

f (ˆ x |e )
f (ˆ x |e)
 v−rS
0
[ρ(v − rS − x) − min{ˆ rJ,v− rS − x}] f (x | e)dx
= 0. (A2)
The lone inequality follows from (MLRP), and the last equality follows from (A1).
By (A1),
U(K, ˆ r,e) − U(K,r,e) =
 v−rS
0
[ρ(v − rS − x) − min{ˆ rJ,v− rS − x}] f (x |e)dx = 0. (A3)
Hence, for any e  < e,
U(K, ˆ r,e) − U(K, ˆ r,e
 ) ≥ U(K,r,e) − U(K,r,e
 ) ≥ 0, (A4)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from (A2) and the second follows from the fact that (K, r, e) satisﬁes (IC). By Step
1, the optimal precaution ˆ e ∈ argmax˜ e∈R U(K, ˆ r, ˜ e) is unique. Hence, if ˆ e < e, U(K, ˆ r,e) < U(K, ˆ r, ˆ e), which would
contradict (A4). We thus conclude that ˆ e ≥ e.
It follows from this last fact that
 (ˆ r, ˆ e; ) =

X
π(x, ˆ r, ) f (x | ˆ e)dx ≥

X
π(x, ˆ r, ) f (x |e)dx =  (ˆ r,e; ) =  (r,e; ) ≥ K,
where the ﬁrst inequality holds because π is nonincreasing in x and f has (MLRP)i n( − x, e), the second equality follows
from the construction of ˆ r, the third equality follows from (A1), and the last inequality holds because (K, r, e) satisﬁes
(IR). We thus conclude that (K, ˆ r, ˆ e) satisﬁes (IR).
Thus far, we have shown that (K, ˆ r, ˆ e) is feasible. We now show that the ﬁrm (weakly) prefers (K, ˆ r, ˆ e)t o( K, r,
e), which holds because
U(K, ˆ r, ˆ e) ≥ U(K, ˆ r,e) = U(K,r,e),
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that (K, ˆ r, ˆ e) satisﬁes (IC), and the equality follows from (A3).
To prove the last statement, consider a shift from(K, r, e)t oa n y(K, ˜ r, ˜ e), where ˜ r = (˜ rS, ˜ rJ) is an all-debt ﬁnancial
contract. Suppose both are feasible, the ﬁrm prefers the shift, but, contrary to the claim, ˜ e < e. Then, because ˜ e < e ≤ ˆ e
and (K, ˜ r, ˜ e) satisﬁes (IC), Step 1 implies that ˜ rS + ˜ rJ > ˆ rS + ˆ rJ,w h e r eˆ r = (ˆ rS, ˆ rJ) is deﬁned in (A1). Observe
U(K, ˜ r, ˜ e) < U(K, ˆ r, ˜ e) < U(K, ˆ r,e) = U(K,r,e).
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TheﬁrstinequalityholdsbecauseU(K,·, ˜ e)isstrictlyincreasing,thesecondfollowsfromthestrictconcavityofU(K, ˆ r,·)
and ˜ e < e ≤ ˆ e, and the equality follows from (A3). The ﬁrm will therefore never prefer (K, ˜ r, ˜ e)t o( K, r, e). Because
this is a contradiction, we conclude that ˜ e ≥ e, as was to be shown.
Step 3. For any feasible (K, r, e) with all-debt structure and rJ > 0, there exists a feasible senior-debt-only
structure (K, ˆ r,e), with ˆ rJ = 0, which the ﬁrm prefers over (K, r). A shift to any feasible senior-debt-only structure that
the ﬁrm prefers results in a (weakly) higher precaution.
Proof. Fix any feasible (K, r, e). Consider ﬁrst a senior-debt-only structure r   = (r 
S, 0) with r 
S = rS + rJ.O b s e r v e
for each ˜ e ∈ R+,
U(K,r , ˜ e) = K − k +
 v−r 
S
0
(v − r
 
S − x) f (x |e)dx − c(˜ e)
= K − k +
 v−rS−rJ
0
(v − rS − rJ − x) f (x |e)dx − c(˜ e)
= U(K,r, ˜ e),
so (r  , e) satisﬁes (IC). Further,
π(x;r
 , ) = r
 
S −  (x) = rS + rJ −  (x) ≥ rS + min{rJ,z}− (x) = π(x;r, ).
Hence,
 (r
 ,e; ) =

X
π(x;r
 , ) f (x |e)dx ≥

X
π(x;r, ) f (x |e)dx =  (r,e; ) ≥ K, (A5)
proving that (r  , e) satisﬁes (IR), and is thus feasible.
Because  (r, e;  ) is continuous and strictly increasing in r, there exists a senior-debt-only structure ˆ r = (ˆ rS,0)
with ˆ rS ≤ rS + rJ such that
 (ˆ r,e; ) =  (r,e; ). (A6)
Consider any e  ∈ R+. Then,
U(K, ˆ r,e ) − U(K,r,e )
=
 v−ˆ rS
0
(v − ˆ rS − x) f (x |e
 )dx −
 v−rS−rJ
0
(v − rS − rJ − x) f (x |e
 )dx
=
 v−ˆ rS
0
F(x |e
 )dx −
 v−rS−rJ
0
F(x |e
 )dx
=
 v−ˆ rS
v−rS−rJ
F(x |e
 )dx ≥ 0. (A7)
Furthermore, the last line is nondecreasing in e , which implies ˆ e ≥ e,w h e r e
ˆ e = argmax
e ∈R+
U(K, ˆ r,e
 ). (A8)
Hence, (K, ˆ r, ˆ e) satisﬁes (IC). It also satisﬁes (IR), because
 (ˆ r, ˆ e; ) ≥  (ˆ r,e; ) =  (r,e; ) ≥ K,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows because   is nondecreasing in e, the ﬁrst equality follows from (A6), and the second
inequality follows from (K, r, e) being feasible.
Because (K, ˆ r, ˆ e) is feasible, it sufﬁces to show that the ﬁrm prefers (K, ˆ r, ˆ e)t o(K, r, e), which follows because
U(K, ˆ r, ˆ e) ≥ U(K, ˆ r,e) ≥ U(K,r,e), (A9)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from (A8), and the second follows from (A7).
To prove the last statement, consider a shift from (K, r, e)t oa n y(K, ˜ r, ˜ e), where ˜ r = (˜ rS,0) is a senior-debt-only
ﬁnancial contract. Suppose both are feasible and the ﬁrm prefers the shift, but, contrary to the claim, ˜ e < e. Then, because
(K, r, e)a n d(K, ˜ r, ˜ e) both satisfy (IC), by Step 1, we must have ˜ rS > rS + rJ. Step 1 then further implies that
U(K, ˜ r, ˜ e) < U(K,r,e),
so the ﬁrm will never prefer (K, ˜ r, ˜ e)t o(K, r, e), a contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that ˜ e ≥ e.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Lemma 1  implies that the social planner would choose the senior-debt-only structure (i.e.,
with rJ = 0). (The social planner would prefer to choose a structure that induces the highest precaution from the ﬁrm.)
We next show that the social planner would choose  (·) = 0. To see this, ﬁx any (r, K, e,  ) that satisﬁes (IC)a n d
(IR), where K ∈ [k, v], r = (rS,0 ) ,a n d (·) ≥ 0. We show that there exists (ˆ r, K, ˆ e, ˆ  ), with ˆ  (·) = 0a n dˆ e ≥ e, satisfying
(IC)a n d(IR).
To this end, consider ﬁrst (r, K, e, 0). Because this gives exactly the same payoff to the ﬁrm, it satisﬁes (IC).
Further,
π(x;r,0) = rS ≥ rS −  (x) = π(x;r, ).
Hence,
 (r,e;0)≥  (r,e; ) ≥ K, (A10)
so (r, K, e, 0) satisﬁes (IR).
Hence, as before, there exists ˆ r = (ˆ rS,0) with ˆ rS ≤ rS such that
 (ˆ r,e;0)=  (r,e; ). (A11)
Because ˆ rS ≤ rS, the same argument as in Step 2 of Lemma 1  proves that there exists ˆ e ≥ e such that (ˆ r, K, ˆ e,0) satisﬁes
(IR)a n d(IC). Consequently, it is optimal for the social planner to choose   = 0.
Because the social planner chooses a senior-debt-only structure and imposes no liability on the lender, the social
planner’s choice coincides with that of the unregulated ﬁrm, except K. In other words, e0(K) is precisely the precaution
level the social planner induces with the choice of K ≥ k. Hence, the social welfare level associated with K ≥ k is W(K,
e0(K)). It is straightforward to check that W(K, e0(K)) is nonincreasing in K for K ≥ k. Hence, we conclude that K ∗ =
k and e∗ = e0(k).
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